Are we wasting public money? No! The effects of grants on Italian university students’ performances by Agasisti, Tommaso & Murtinu, Samuele
 ARE WE WASTING PUBLIC MONEY? NO! THE EFFECTS OF GRANTS ON ITALIAN 
UNIVERSITY STUDENTS’ PERFORMANCES  
Tommaso Agasisti, Samuele Murtinu 





Documents de Treball de l’IEB 2013/33 
ARE WE WASTING PUBLIC MONEY? NO! 
THE EFFECTS OF GRANTS ON ITALIAN  
UNIVERSITY STUDENTS’ PERFORMANCES 
 
 





The Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB) is a research centre at the University of 
Barcelona which specializes in the field of applied economics. Through the IEB-
Foundation, several private institutions (Applus, Abertis, Ajuntament de Barcelona, 




Institut d’Economia de Barcelona 
Facultat d’Economia i Empresa 
Universitat de Barcelona 
C/ Tinent Coronel Valenzuela, 1-11 
(08034) Barcelona, Spain 
Tel.: + 34 93 403 46 46 





The IEB working papers represent ongoing research that is circulated to encourage 
discussion and has not undergone a peer review process. Any opinions expressed here 
are those of the author(s) and not those of IEB. 
  
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 2013/33 
ARE WE WASTING PUBLIC MONEY? NO! 
THE EFFECTS OF GRANTS ON ITALIAN  
UNIVERSITY STUDENTS’ PERFORMANCES * 
 
 




ABSTRACT:  In this paper, we estimate the effect of receiving a financial aid for a 
cohort of students who enrolled at Politecnico di Milano (Italy) in the year 2007/08, 
through a Propensity Score Matching approach. Using administrative data about these 
students for four years, we were able to evaluate the impact of the financial aid on several 
dimensions of academic performance: formative credits obtained after one year, dropout 
probability in the first and second year, graduation in the legal duration of the course, and 
graduation after four years. Overall, we find a positive and statistically significant effect 
of the grant; this finding is stable across several robustness checks. Exploring the 
heterogeneity of this effect, we demonstrate that this latter is higher for immigrants, 
Italians who moved from another region for studying, and students attending an 
Engineering course. We also find evidence that unobservable factors (such as students’ 
own intrinsic academic motivation) account for an important part of the estimated impact 
of the financial aid.   
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!1. Introduction 
Despite higher education (HE) provision and participation has been expanded during 
1990s and 2000s in Italy, the inequality of educational opportunities is still a major 
problem for the country. In particular, students with low socioeconomic backgrounds 
experience a low probability to enroll to universities, and thus to complete tertiary 
education (Checchi et al., 2013). Bratti et al. (2008), studying the evolution of the HE 
sector in recent years, conclude that “(…) the rapid expansion of HE supply in the 
1990s may have only produced a limited increase in equality of opportunities in terms 
of completion of tertiary education, and partly explain why tertiary educational 
attainment in Italy is still strongly related to parents’ education” (p. 79).1 The problem 
of low inter-generational mobility affects the Italian educational system as a whole, 
and engenders negative consequences: “Italian public university system (…) does not 
attract the expected educational investment of poor families. Indeed, the Italian 
system does not offer a real opportunity for children of lower income families to 
emerge and to keep the returns of their educational investment” (Checchi et al., 1999; 
p. 353).  
In Italy, the provision of grants to university students with poor socioeconomic 
background has a twofold aim: i) favor their participation to tertiary education; and ii) 
reduce their dependence on work, so helping them to pass exams and graduate. 
Originally, the Italian legislation designed a grant scheme that was partly need-based 
and partly merit-based. In such scheme, academic requirements were included as 
conditions to obtain the grant and maintain it during the academic career. However, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1  Similar concerns have been expressed in other countries. For instance, Posselt et al. (2012) 
demonstrated that, in the US, the gap in the probability to enroll to selective colleges between 
Latinos/Blacks and White/Asian students is stable, despite the expansion of the access to post-
secondary education.  
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!the program has been changed over time, and merit-based criteria have been softened. 
First, when the student enrolls as freshman, the only requirement is coming from a 
disadvantaged family. Second, in the subsequent years the number of formative 
credits (Cfu) that the student must obtain to maintain the grant is quite low. As an 
example of the latter proposition, to maintain the grant in the second year the 
threshold of Cfu at the first year is 25, out of the 60 Cfu that each student can obtain 
in the first year.  
Moreover, past research highlighted that many students, who obtained a grant, 
actually dropout after few months. Some observers, looking at the program design, 
and the statistics about low graduation rates among grants’ beneficiaries, accused the 
financial aid system to be ineffective and a waste of public money. However, rigorous 
evidence on this lack of positive effects is still scarce.   
From a theoretical point of view, there are many reasons for which need-based grants 
can influence students’ academic results. As discussed by Hatt et al. (2005, p. 385), 
“(…) the money itself might be useful and, secondly, the money might strengthen the 
student’s commitment to study”. In other words, financial aid can: (i) reduce liquidity 
constraints, and so help students to organize their life orienteering the efforts towards 
studying (i.e. avoiding work activities), and (ii) give explicit incentives towards better 
results, this way stimulating intrinsic motivation towards studying (this latter effect is 
related to the presence of merit-based components of the grant program). In this 
direction, recent empirical research shows that the incentive structure of the 
scholarships often matters more than the additional income (Barrow & Rouse, 2012). 
Further, it must be evaluated if the financial aid programs are able to improve the 
3
!students’ commitment to college, and especially their motivation to provide more 
effort in studying2.  
This paper empirically assesses the impact of receiving a grant for a cohort of 
students who enrolled as freshmen at one important big and public Italian university - 
Politecnico di Milano - through a matching technique that allows us to compare the 
grant beneficiaries’ performances with those of similar students who did not obtain 
the grant. The empirical analysis does not focus on the real effectiveness of grants in 
stimulating participation to HE, but on their ability to help students improving their 
academic performances. Such characteristic of the study is of strategic relevance: 
indeed, previous studies demonstrated that the expansion of HE opportunities (i.e. 
more students attending university, even from disadvantaged backgrounds) does not 
immediately translate into better results [graduation rates] for poorer students (Bratti 
et al., 2008).  
Our findings suggest that obtaining a grant positively affects academic performances. 
Students who receive a financial aid obtain more formative credits, have less 
probability to dropout in the first and second year, and are more likely to graduate on 
time or within four years, when compared with similar counterparts who did not 
receive the grant. This result is stable across a wide set of robustness checks. This 
positive effect is also heterogeneous. In fact, the most part of it is concentrated among 
immigrants, students whose family resides in another regions (“out-of-region” 
students), and those attending an Engineering course. The effect of the grant is not 
“cumulative”, i.e. it is not dependent upon the fact that students receive the grant 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 A recent paper by Carruthers & Özek (2013) illustrates how losing aid (specifically, Georgia HOPE) 
exerted a negative effect on motivation and led students to work more during college, not only for 
liquidity constraints.   
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!during their entire academic path. Lastly, when using a more precise control group, 
composed by students who are likely to share also unobservable factors (i.e., intrinsic 
academic motivation) with those who received a grant, the impact of financial aid 
seems even bigger, and particularly effective in the first years of academic career.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the sections 2 and 3, we 
provide a literature review and background for the Italian system of student support. 
Sections 4, 5 and 6 are devoted to data, identification strategy and methodology, 
respectively. Section 7 contains the results of our empirical analysis. Section 8 
concludes.  
 
2. Literature review 
In the US, there is a huge literature about the role of financial aids in stimulating 
participation to HE and fostering academic performances. A recent contribution by 
Dynarski & Scott-Clayton (2013) summarized the main evidence coming from the 
research in this field. The authors illustrate how the growing availability of grants and 
loans, in the US, had a significant impact on increasing college enrolments. At the 
same time, they suggest to focus the attention on programs’ design and 
characteristics: “No longer is it necessary to ask the question, ‘Does aid work?’ – for 
the research definitely shows that it can. But the evidence also suggests that some 
programs work better than others, and (…) the stakes have never been higher for 
understanding what aid programs work best and why” (p. 32). Fewer studies 
investigate the effects of aids not only on enrolment, but also on academic 
performances. The results suggest that grants which provide explicit incentives to 
5
!students’ performances (the so-called “merit-based” grants) are more effective than 
purely need-based programs.  
Nonetheless, two recent studies about US aid programs are worthy of specific notice 
because of their similarity with the approach presented in this paper. Castleman & 
Long (2012) evaluated the impact of the Florida Student Access Grant, a need-based 
program, on several dimensions of students’ performances, among which the 
accumulation of formative credits and graduation. The empirical analysis reveals that 
the aid positively affects academic outputs, and does not contribute only to raising 
participation. Scott-Clayton (2012) examined the PROMISE program in West 
Virginia, which consists of free tuition for students who obtain good academic 
performances. The author finds that the financial aid has a positive impact on 
students’ performances, but limited to the proficiency levels required for the annual 
renewal of the benefit. The paper claims that the positive effects on academic results 
must be attributed to the incentives contained in the aid mechanism. The two papers 
are interesting as they are inserted in the wider discussion about the relative effects of 
different aid programs, based on their need- or merit-based nature.3 As our paper 
considers a grant program which has components of both types, the discussion of our 
results has been informed of these studies. Moreover, we were also stimulated by the 
recent proposal of Brookings Institution (2012) to “(…) moving away from the 
dichotomy between need-based and merit-based aid and instead designing programs 
that integrate targeting of students with financial need with appropriate expectations 
and support for college success” (p. 2).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 The debate about the importance of merit- or need-based orientation of financial aids is gaining more 
and more attention by the wide public in the US. For instance,,see the viewpoints hosted by the Wall 
Street Journal (2012) in favor and against a renewed focus on need-based grants.  
6
!In Europe, the most part of previous studies is still focused on the effects of financial 
aids on enrolment (e.g., Nielsen et al., 2010; Steiner & Wrohlic, 2012). Conversely, 
few works look at the effects of aids on academic outputs. Arendt (2013) discusses 
the impact on students’ results of a Danish reform, which changed the available 
financial aid to Danish university students. The author shows the positive influence of 
increasing grants’ amount on reducing dropout; further, the heterogeneity of such 
effect is explored between subgroups of students. Belot et al. (2007) explored the 
impact of a reform in the Dutch higher education system, which reduced the duration 
of (mostly merit-based) grants of one year. The authors considered several 
dimensions of academic performances, such as passing the first-year exam, drop-out 
and grade points. Through a difference-in-difference strategy, they demonstrate that 
the reform positively affects students’ results.4 Glocker (2011) used a duration model 
to analyze if financial aid helps German university students to shorten graduation time 
and reduce dropout. The results show that students who benefited from aid actually 
experienced lower dropout, but did not graduate faster.  Leuven et al. (2010) reported 
the results from a randomized experiment conducted in a department of Economics at 
a Dutch university, showing that financial incentives (not aid) helped high-ability 
students to obtain higher academic results, while impacting negatively on less-able 
students.   
In Italy, the literature on this topic is quite sparse. Mealli & Rampichini (2012) 
studied the effects of grants on the students enrolled at the University of Florence and 
found that these have a significant impact in reducing dropout. These results are in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 It is important to note that this empirical analysis does not answer the question ‘does the aid matter?’ 
directly, but only explores if different treatments (different duration of grant programs) have different 
impacts on students’ results. 
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!line with those reported by Aristelli et al. (2001) on the same university. Mele & 
Sciclone (2004) used matching techniques to evaluate the effectiveness of grants in 
eleven Italian universities, for two cohorts of students (those enrolled in 1998/99 and 
1999/2000). The authors report a heterogeneous effect of the grant: it is effective for 
some typologies of students but not for others, and in some universities but not in 
others. However, a general finding is that obtaining a grant matters more for students 
who attend university outside the region in which they reside. Overall, the magnitude 
of the effects seems quite modest. Graziosi (2012) analyzed a particular case, that of 
the University of Trieste, which accompanied the traditional need-based grants with a 
more innovative merit-based grant program (funded by a local foundation). Using 
matching techniques, the author demonstrates that need-based grants reduce dropout, 
while merit-based ones help students in graduating on time.  
The present paper is innovative in the context of Italian academic literature for three 
reasons. First, we assess the effects of grants on a wider array of academic results: 
formative credits acquired in the first year, dropout in the first and second year, 
graduation on time, and graduation within four years (one year later than the legal 
duration of the courses). Second, we explicitly focus on various dimensions of 
effects’ heterogeneity, related to student type (immigrants vs Italians, students whose 
family lives in the same city in which they are attending university vs those who come 
from another region) and course attended (Engineering vs Architecture and Design). 
Third, we explore whether unobservable factors affect the results, i.e., we analyze if 
students who obtained a grant perform better than similar ones who: i) did not receive 
a grant; and ii) share not only observable characteristics, but also (intrinsic and 
unobservable) motivation.  
8
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3. Background: student support in Italy 
In Italy, the responsibility for student support is in charge of the national 
government.5 A national regulation defines the criteria for grants eligibility, which are 
two: (i) economic conditions of the student’s family and (ii) academic performance. 
The former is the only parameter to take into account when evaluating the eligibility 
of students in their first year. While, the latter is necessary to maintain eligibility in 
the second and third year of the bachelor. The same criteria are used when 
determining master students’ eligibility, but in this paper we focus exclusively on 
bachelor students.  
Overall, the grants can be considered much more as need-based than merit-based, 
because of two reasons. First, performance in secondary schooling is not a 
requirement for obtaining the grant in the first year of tertiary education. Second, the 
performance requirement in the second and third year is quite low: the students should 
obtain 25 formative credits (Cfu) at the end of the first year, and 80 at the end of the 
second. Given that the expected number of credits acquired by each student is 60 Cfu 
every year, the threshold is around 41% and 66% of the expected performance (for the 
first and second year, respectively). Nonetheless, data provided by the Ministry of 
Education report that, on average, Italian students acquired around 30 Cfu every year 
(50% of the expected performance).6 So, students who want to maintain the grant can 
just perform in line with the national average. As we will show later, this is different 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 The description provided in this section concerns the student support system, which is operating until 
2012/13. Some recent legislative reforms are slightly changing the scenario, but without affecting the 
overall functioning of the system. However, the empirical analysis conducted in this paper concerns the 
period 2007/08-2009/10.  
6 Data come from the Report “Higher Education in Italy 2009-10”, published by the Ministry of 
Education; see table 2.2.5 “Cfu annually acquired by the students in Italy, 2009”.  
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!for the university under scrutiny in this study, as the average performance of its 
students is higher than the national average.   
In Italy, the number of students who obtain a grant is quite low. In the academic year 
2010/11, for instance, supported students were around 130,000 out of a total of 
1,700,000 (about 7.5%). In many European countries, the proportion of students 
assisted with some need-based or merit-based grants or loans is much higher: about 
70% in the Netherlands and Sweden, 60% in England, 30% in France, 25% in 
Germany (Department for Business Innovation & Skills, 2010). There are many 
reasons that explain why the proportion of assisted students in Italy is so low. Among 
them, the financial threshold for determining need-based eligibility is set at a very low 
level, and the public funds available for this policy are low and reducing over time.  
Prospective students who want to apply for a grant send an application to a Regional 
agency or to their chosen university, which manage the different administrative 
activities related to the student support system: the collection of applications, the 
selection of eligible students, and the money flows to the students. Eligible students 
are then classified in three categories: “near-home” students (those whose family lives 
in the same city in which they are attending university), “commuting” students (those 
whose family lives in cities located near that in which they are attending university, 
and who commute daily) and “far-from-home” students (those whose family lives far 
from the university’s city). The latter students are considered likely to be moved from 
their parents’ house and living alone in the university’s city. In the academic year 
2010/11, near-home beneficiaries represented around 20% of the total, while the 
proportion of commuting and far-from-home beneficiaries was 30% and 50%, 
respectively.  All beneficiaries are exonerated from paying universities’ fees, so the 
10
!amount of the grant is only intended to help covering living costs (apartment’s 
renting, meals, educational materials, etc.). For this reason, the amount of the grant is 
differentiated across the three types of beneficiaries. In the academic year 2010/11, it 
was around € 1,700/year for near-home ones, € 2,600/year for commuting ones, and € 
4,700/year for “far-from-home” beneficiaries. Such amounts seem low not only when 
compared with those available in other countries, but also when compared with 
students’ living costs: Italian studies based on surveys report that living costs are 
40/50% higher than the amount of grants (Catalano & Figà Talamanca, 2002).  
A major problem affecting the student support system is that a part of the students, 
who are eligible for a grant, actually do not receive it because of the lack of funding. 
On average, in the last years, around 25% of eligible students were not beneficiaries 
(see Figure 1).  
[Figure 1] around here 
The university, which has been selected for our study, is a big public institution 
located in Milan, in the Northern Italy, named Politecnico di Milano. It enrolls around 
38,000 students (year 2010/11), and is an Engineering-focused institution that also 
offers courses in Design and Architecture. The problem of “eligible-but-not-
beneficiaries” did not exist in the period 2006-2011 (so, before and after the period of 
our analysis), as all the eligible students actually received the grant.  
 
4. Data 
We collected data about all the first-year students who entered at Politecnico di 
Milano in the academic year 2007/08, and we followed this cohort for four years 
(until the academic year 2010/11). The figure 2 illustrates the reason behind the 
11
!public discourse about the lack of effectiveness of student aid. At Politecnico di 
Milano, 453 freshmen received the grant in 2007/08, on the basis of (only) their 
socio-economic background. When moving to the second year, a merit-based criteria 
is considered to “confirm” the grant: around 40% of those who obtained the grant in 
the first year did not meet these requirements and lose the grant. When looking at the 
third year, only 43.7% of the initial recipients met the merit-based requirements to 
maintain the grant. 
[Figure 2] around here 
Such low retention rates (which are even pretty high compared with many other 
Italian universities) stimulated questions about the effectiveness of grants. Many 
observers consider this phenomenon as a waste of public money, as a high proportion 
of students received a (publicly funded) grant, but did not succeed. However, such 
interpretation could be misleading. In fact, observing simple statistics about grants’ 
confirmation rates does not tell anything about the “causal” effect of the grant. In 
other words, we would instead have to answer the following question: “which average 
performance would have the granted students shown if they had not been granted?”. 
Our empirical analysis explores exactly this issue. In so doing, we need to build a 
suitable and reliable control group of non-granted students (comparable with granted 
ones). This control group should be based on students’ observable characteristics 
responsible for their academic performance. In our dataset, such observable 
characteristics are: a dummy that equals unity if the focal student is a male (Male); a 
dummy that equals unity if the focal student is a “regular” student, i.e. if she/he was 
born in 1989 or 1990 (Born in 1989|1990); three mutually exclusive dummies that 
take value 1 if the focal student was born in the Lombardy Region – where 
12
!Politecnico di Milano operates - (Near_home_student), in an Italian region different 
from Lombardy (Other_region_student), or in a foreign country (Immigrant), 
alternatively; three mutually exclusive dummies that equal unity if the focal student 
attends the faculty of Design (Course_Design), Architecture (Course_Architecture), 
or Engineering (Course_Engineering), alternatively; four mutually exclusive 
dummies, whether:  
the secondary school attended by the focal student was a Lyceum, a technical school, 
a vocational school or a foreign school type, alternatively (the names of the variables 
are: Secondary_schooltype_Lyceum, Secondary_schooltype_Technical, 
Secondary_schooltype_Vocational,  Secondary_schooltype_Foreign. 
It can be noted that we do not have direct information about students’ socioeconomic 
background, which is likely to have an impact to their performances. However, we 
were able to obtain such information indirectly, and this feature also constitutes our 
central hypothesis for identifying the effect of receiving a grant (see next section).  
As output variables, we define five students’ academic performance measures: (i) the 
number of formative credits obtained after the first year, (ii) the dropout status at the 
first year (1=yes, 0=no), (iii) the dropout status at the second year (1=yes, 0=no),7 (iv) 
graduation in the legal duration of the course (1=yes, 0=no),8 and (v) graduation 
within four years (1=yes, 0=no).  
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7  The dropout status is not defined in an administrative sense, as students are not obliged to 
communicate their decision to dropout to university’s administrative offices. Instead, a student is 
considered to be dropped-out if she/he did not obtain formative credits in a given year. The number of 
students who did not obtain formative credits in the year t and do so in the year t+1 is negligible (in our 
sample, around 1.5%).  
8 The phenomenon of students remaining enrolled for more than the legal duration of study is one of 
the major ones for the Italian HE system, even though data from AlmaLaurea Consortium show that 
the proportion of students who obtain graduation within the legal duration increased from 10% in 2001 
to more than 40% in 2012 (www.almalaurea.it; Report on graduates 2012).  
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!5. Identification strategy and descriptive statistics 
As the main aim of this paper is to assess the causal effect of receiving a grant on the 
students' academic performances, we should rely upon an adequate methodological 
approach. We only had access to administrative data, and thus we were not able to 
resort to a randomized assignment of the grant to a sample of students. We then opted 
for a propensity score matching (PSM) approach, through which we build a control 
group for the “treated” students (those who received a grant; thus, the treatment is 
obtaining a grant). Besides the grant, there are many factors that are likely to affect 
students' academic performances. So, we must be sure to match students who are very 
similar and differ only for their treatment status. The available variables to apply the 
matching procedure are described in detail in the previous section. One of the main 
factors affecting achievement is the student’s socioeconomic status (SES). 9 
Unfortunately, the university does not collect direct information about the students’ 
SES.  
However, we took advantage of a specific characteristic of the system to collect 
students’ fees at Politecnico di Milano to obtain an indirect proxy of students’ SES. 
The fee that each student should pay is calculated on the basis of her/his family’s 
income: the university defines nine levels, which correspond to a growing amount of 
the fee. Students who refute to declare their family’s income are classified in the level 
10 (the highest one). Students coming from a disadvantaged background have a strong 
incentive to declare their family’s income. To give an idea, in the academic year 
2009/10 students classified in the level 2 paid around € 800/year, while those in the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 An evidence about this point that is closely related to the focus of our work comes from a paper by 
Powdthavee & Vignoles (2009), who found that there is a gap in the probability of dropping out at 
university between students with low and high socioeconomic background.  
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!level 10 paid more than € 3,500/year. The fee is composed of two parts: the first must 
be paid by all students and is around € 400, while the second is dependent upon the 
income declared. It is important to note that also students who receive a grant must 
pay the first component of the fee, so all the students must declare their income to be 
assigned to a specific fee level in the scale. Indeed, the request to obtain a grant 
should be formulated after the payment of the fee’s first part. When the focal student 
receives a grant in the subsequent weeks, then the fee she/he paid is reimbursed. 
Such mechanism is important for our identification strategy. In fact, we see that the 
most part (92%) of students who received a grant are actually classified in the level 2 
of the fee scale. The other students in the level 2 who did not receive the grant are 
then our control group (hereafter, “baseline control group”). There are many reasons 
for which a student who is in the level 2 did not receive the grant. A first reason is 
that she/he did not request it because of lack of information, or administrative burdens 
that prevented her/him access to the procedure for obtaining the grant. Moreover, 
there are students who are able to cover their living expenses without a grant (for 
instance, by living at parents or relatives’ home) and prefer this solution. However, 
there are also students who applied for a grant, but did not receive it: it is often the 
case of students who made errors in the administrative procedure.10 We consider this 
latter group as our preferable control group (hereafter, “narrower control group”), as 
they share the motivation to apply for a grant, that is an unobservable factor in 
common with the treated students.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Of course, there are students whose family’s income level is higher than the required threshold. 
However, these students are not classified in the level 2 of the fee scale, so they do not invalidate our 
identification strategy.  
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!Table 1 provides the numbers about the students we analyzed. As it can be seen in the 
Panel A, in the academic year 2007/08, 1,606 students were classified in the level 2 of 
the fee scale: our empirical analysis focuses on them. Within this group, there are 416 
“treated” students, who received a grant, and 1,190 students who did not (our baseline 
control group). Among these 1,190 students, 46 requested a grant but did not receive 
it, and they represent our “narrower control group”.  
[Table 1] around here 
However, these abovementioned groups of “treated” and “untreated” students must be 
reduced because of missing values on some important variables. More specifically, 
there was missing information on the variable “Secondary_School_Type”, which is a 
strong predictor of students' academic performance. When removing the students for 
whom this variable is missing, the number of observations reduces by about 15% for 
students who obtained a grant and 25% for non-beneficiaries (see Table 2, panel A). 
Despite such differences in the proportion of missing data between the two groups of 
students, through a battery of t-tests we show that there is not a non-random 
distribution of missing information, with reference to both students’ characteristics 
and performances (panel B). The only exceptions are related to: i) the type of 
secondary school, as expected – as it was the variable for which we have missing 
values; and ii) near-home and immigrant students, as it appears that our final sample 
contains slightly more immigrants and less near-home students. However, the sample 
is fully representative of the population when looking at outputs, so we can conclude 
that we did not exclude particular groups of students who might bias the results. 
Overall, chi2 tests about the joint representativeness of the different variables reveal 
that our sample is representative of the corresponding population of students.      
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![Table 2] around here 
After this check, we restricted our analysis to the sample of students for whom there 
is no missing information on the relevant variables: in the first year (2007/08), the 
sample comprises 1,223 students (354 who received a grant, and 869 “untreated” 
ones). Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 3. Some differences between the 
two groups are noteworthy. First, the proportion of students who were born in 1989 or 
1990 is slightly lower for the groups of beneficiaries (63% vs 74%). Second, the 
proportion of immigrant students is very high among “treated” students (40% vs 18% 
of untreated ones), and also the proportion of students coming from another Italian 
region. The reason for this disparity is that the average income in regions other than 
Lombardy is lower, so a higher proportion of students obtains the grant, all else equal. 
The representativeness of the three courses (design, architecture and engineering) is 
similar between students with and without the grant. When looking at the secondary 
school type, the proportion of students who attended a Lyceum is similar in the two 
groups (around 55%), while the number of students with a foreign degree is higher 
among treated students (31% vs 12%). It must be underlined that not all the 
immigrant students obtained a degree in a foreign country, as some of them lived in 
Italy when attending secondary school: this explains why among 40% of immigrant 
students who obtained a grant, only 31% have a foreign secondary schooling degree.  
[Table 3] around here 
A glance to the two output indicators reveals that: (i) the average number of formative 
credits (Cfu) acquired by treated students in the first year (2007/08) is higher than that 
obtained by the untreated students (42.4/60 vs 34.3/60), and (ii) the dropout 
propensity is lower for students who obtained a grant (8% vs 21%). Figure 3 plots the 
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!entire distribution of the number of formative credits acquired by the sampled 
students in the academic year 2007/08. Figure 4 illustrates the (cumulated) number of 
Cfu acquired at the end of the third year (2009/10). In both cases, it appears that the 
distribution of treated students dominates that of untreated ones. It is worth noting 
that such evidence must be interpreted as a correlation, and not as causal relationship, 
as we did not control for the composition of the two groups of students, which is 
pretty different as already discussed (we illustrate the methodology we used to this 
purpose in the next section).  
[Figure 3] around here  
[Figure 4] around here  
In Table 4, we take a closer look at the cohort of students, who are analyzed in this 
work. In the first year there are 1,223 students (see above): 354 treated students and 
869 who represent the control group. In the second year, only 1,011 of them (82.7%) 
are still enrolled, and the dropout rate of 17.3% is in line with the national average. 
Among the “survived” students, 224 received the grant in both years, 622 students did 
not obtain the grant neither in the first year nor in the second year, 101 students 
obtained the grant in the first year but not in the second year, and 64 students obtained 
the grant in the second year but not in the first year. An important remark is due here. 
It is certainly possible that other two categories of students obtained a grant in the 
academic year 2008/09 but are not included in the empirical analysis: (i) those who 
were not classified in the fee scale 2 in the academic year 2007/08, and (ii) those who 
moved to Politecnico di Milano after their first year in another HE institute. As we 
use a cohort-based approach, we deliberately exclude these two groups of students.  
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!When considering the third year (2009/10), only 845 students of the original cohort 
are still enrolled at Politecnico di Milano (“survival rate”: 69.1%): 166 students 
received the grant for three years consecutively, while 470 students never received the 
grant.  
[Table 4] around here 
 
6. Methodology 
As baseline method, we run the following simple OLS regression: 
yi =α1X i +α2GRANTi +εi         (1) 
where yi is the output for the i
th student (one of the five performance measures 
presented in Section 4, namely (i) the number of formative credits obtained after the 
first year, (ii) dropout at the first year, (iii) dropout at the second year, (iv) graduation 
in the legal duration of the course, or (v) graduation after four years, alternatively); Xi 
is the vector of students’ characteristics described in Section 4 (Male; Born in 
1989|1990; Near_home_student; Other_region_student; Immigrant; Course_Design; 
Course_Architecture; Course_Engineering; Secondary_schooltype_Lyceum; 
Secondary_schooltype_Technical; Secondary_schooltype_Vocational; 
Secondary_schooltype_Foreign). The treatment (GRANTi) is alternatively defined as: 
• the receipt of a grant in the first academic year (2007/08), when yi is the 
number of formative credits acquired in the academic year 2007/08 or the 
dropout rate at the first year; 
• the receipt of a grant in both the first and the second year (2007/08 and 
2008/09) when yi is the dropout rate at the second year; 
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!• the receipt of a grant in the first, second and third year (from 2007/08 to 
2009/10) when yi is graduation (either in the legal duration of the course or 
after four years).  
Four out of the five output variables (all but the number of formative credits obtained 
after the first year) are dichotomous. So, we estimated a logit regression instead of a 
traditional OLS.11 The results obtained through these simple regressions are likely to 
be biased, as the grants are not randomly assigned. To properly evaluate the average 
impact exerted by the receipt of a grant on students’ performance, we define two 
“states of nature”: 1) the “treated” students (who received a grant); 2) the “untreated” 
students (who did not receive a grant but are similar to treated students according to a 
set of a priori characteristics). Having defined such states of nature, we apply 
propensity score matching (PSM) methods to match each treated student with a 
similar untreated one.12 In fact, the receipt of a grant can hardly be considered as the 
result of a random process. First, even though the central Government sets a financial 
threshold for determining need-based eligibility, only a portion of potentially eligible 
students at the first year choose to apply for a grant (there is a self-selection process 
on the demand side; see Section 5). Second, the amount of the grant is different 
according to the status of the student (around € 1,700/year for near-home ones, € 
2,600/year for commuting ones, and € 4,700/year for “far-from-home” beneficiaries, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 As a robustness test, we also resorted to a linear probability model, i.e. a binary choice model 
estimated through OLS. The results are fully in line with those found through logit estimation and are 
available upon request from the authors.  
12 There are several examples of the use of PSM to assess educational interventions. Morgan et al. 
(2010) evaluated the effects of special educational services in a sample of US schools. Dearden et al. 
(2005) studied a program of subsidies to reduce dropout in the English secondary schools. Long & 
Kurlaender (2009) assessed whether attending community colleges help graduation (compared to 
traditional 4-years institutions). Heinrich et al. (2010) explored if supplemental educational services 
under No Child Left Behind positively affect students’ results. However, the use of PSM is not 
frequent in assessing the effectiveness of grants for university students, and this represents another 
novelty of this paper.  
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!as explained in Section 3). These differences in financial aid might engender different 
incentives in applying for the grant according to the status of the focal eligible 
student. Third, only a portion of eligible students actually receives the grant because 
of the lack of funding. However this latter self-selection process on the supply side 
does not exist in our sample of students, as all eligible students (who applied for a 
grant) actually received it (see Section 3).  
We built a matched sample of untreated students that were comparable to the sample 
of treated ones according to the characteristics described in previous sections. As a 
first step, following the suggestions of Dehejia & Wahba (2002), we randomized our 
dataset to control for the sensitivity of our procedure to the order of students in the 
dataset. We performed a one-to-one matching without replacement where the 
propensity scores were obtained through a logit model. We opted for a matching 
procedure without replacement due to two reasons: (i) the sufficient number of 
untreated students acting as potential matches of the treated ones; and (ii) an 




The baseline results are reported in Table 5. They can be interpreted as the Average 
Treatment effect on the Treated (ATT), which is the “average” effect of receiving a 
grant for the “average” student in the sample of students who can potentially obtain 
financial aid. In columns 1 and 3, the coefficient of GRANTi is reported when 
estimating through OLS or PSM (when the first stage is run as a logistic regression), 
respectively. In column 2, we report the marginal effect of GRANTi calculated 
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!through the Delta method when estimating through logistic regression. The rows of 
Table 5 show the impact of the treatment on the five academic output measures: (i) 
the number of formative credits obtained after the first year, (ii) dropout at the first 
year, (iii) dropout at the second year, (iv) graduation in the legal duration of the 
course, and (v) graduation after four years. All the estimates point to a positive effect 
of receiving a grant, albeit the more credible PSM approach estimates a slightly lower 
magnitude of the coefficients.  
Before looking at the results in detail, we performed a balancing test on the variables 
included in the PSM (Table 6). First of all, we reported t-tests to verify the “balance” 
of all covariates included in the PSM estimation between treated and untreated 
students, i.e. equality of means before and after matching. Even though we have no 
balance for some covariates before matching, there is a perfect balance (p-values ≥ 
0.1) for all the covariates after matching. Moreover, we tested the reliability of the 
PSM procedure through the comparison between pseudo R2 before and after 
matching, and LR tests on the joint insignificance of covariates before and after 
matching. As regards the former, pseudo R2 after matching are always lower than 
pseudo R2 before matching. As regards the latter, the covariates included in logit 
models before matching explain the focal output; while the same covariates after 
matching are jointly null (Table 7). 
[Table 5] around here 
[Table 6] around here 
[Table 7] around here 
Commenting on the PSM estimates, the receipt of a grant allows a student acquiring 
10.3 formative credits more (out of 60), where the average of the overall cohort of 
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!students is around 36/60. Moreover, the grant reduces the probability to dropout at the 
first year of around 17 percentage points (when compared with the mean). Receiving 
a grant for the first two years consecutively (2007/08 and 2008/09) reduces the 
probability to dropout at the second year of 19.6%. As the average dropout rate in the 
overall cohort of students is 22% in the first year, and 10% in the second year, the 
computed effects (respectively, -3.75% and -2%) must be judged as high. In the last 
two rows of Table 5, we consider as a treatment the receipt of the grant for three years 
consecutively (from 2007/08 to 2009/10). The effect is an increase in the probability 
to graduate on time of 19.3% (with respect to the mean), and in the probability to 
graduate by the end of the fourth year (2010/11) of 25.9%. In the overall cohort of 
students, the figures about on-time graduation rate and graduation rate within the 




As robustness checks, first we used a different version of our matching procedure. 
More specifically, we allowed replacements in the control group, i.e. each treated 
student is compared with the most similar untreated one, even if this latter is matched 
more than once. Second, we estimated the first-stage regression (to calculate 
propensity scores) through a probit regression instead of a logit one.  
Table 8 reports the outcomes of the robustness checks described above. The third 
column reports the baseline PSM estimates shown in Table 5. The results obtained 
using a probit regression to derive propensity scores are virtually identical to the PSM 
results shown in Table 5. Instead, the estimated coefficients when we allow 
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!replacements in the control group are higher than those reported in our baseline 
estimations, as regards three out of five output measures. In fact, the effect of the 
grant is (i) an increase of 15.48 formative credits in the first year (compared to 10.3), 
(ii) a reduction of the probability of first-year dropout of about 21% (compared to 
17%), (iii) an increase of the graduation rate within the fourth year of 30% (compared 
to 26%). As regards the other two output measures, the estimated coefficients when 
we allow replacements in the control group are lower than those reported in our 
baseline estimations. The average effect of the receipt of a grant is (i) a reduction of 
the second-year dropout rate of about 15% (compared to 19.6%), and (ii) a negligible 
impact on the on-time graduation rate. However, all the estimated coefficients are 
more imprecise than those obtained through our baseline procedure (as the lower t-
statistics highlight).  
[Table 8] around here 
 
Heterogeneity 
In the previous analyses, we estimated the “average” effect of the financial aid on 
students' academic performance, i.e. the expected benefit that an average student 
would obtain with a grant. However, such average student does not exist. In a policy 
perspective, it is instead useful to explore the potential heterogeneity of the grants’ 
impact on different subpopulations of students. Using the Dynarski & Scott-Clayton’s 
words: “(…) more research is likely to focus on (…) to what extent program effects 
vary across different type of students” (p. 32). More specifically, we explore whether 
the effect of receiving a grant is different for (i) Italian vs immigrant students, (ii) 
near-home students vs those from different regions, and (iii) students attending an 
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!Engineering course vs those enrolled at the other two courses (Design or 
Architecture). There are a number of reasons explaining a heterogeneous effect of the 
grant. First, immigrants tend to enroll at university less frequently and dropout more 
frequently than Italian students (Cingano & Cipollone, 2007). So, the receipt of a 
grant is likely to have a higher impact on immigrants. Second, surveys conducted 
among Italian university students showed that the most important expenditures are 
related to residential services (Catalano & Figà Talamanca, 2002). To this extent, 
relatively poor students who move to another city/region to attend their courses would 
need more financial aid to cover their expenses. These students when not receiving 
the grant often need to work and this might negatively affect their academic 
performance. So, the receipt of a grant is likely to have a higher impact on Italian 
students from other regions than on "near-home" ones. Lastly, data about Italian 
students’ grades show that, on average, Engineering students obtain lower academic 
performances when compared with other students attending different courses.13 This 
is probably due to the fact that Engineering courses are more difficult than others. If it 
is the case, the impact of receiving a grant should be more beneficial for Engineering 
students. In fact, Engineering students must lavish higher efforts to acquire formative 
credits and graduate than students attending other courses. As a consequence, 
Engineering students would have more incentives to maintain the financial aid to 
avoid going work.  
We performed a PSM analysis for each subgroup separately: i) Italians vs immigrants, 
ii) near-home vs from-other-regions students, and iii) Engineering students vs 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 We analyzed the data reported by AlmaLaurea consortium, which collects detailed information about 
the characteristics of Italian graduate students. In 2011, on average, Italian students obtained a final 
grade of 102.9/100, and the proportion of students who graduates within the legal duration of the 
course is 38.9%. The same figures for Engineering students are 101.3/100 and 31.5%, respectively.  
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!students attending other courses. The results are reported in Table 9 (panel A, B and C 
respectively). In each panel, the third column reports the baseline PSM estimates 
shown in Table 5.  
The results show some interesting patterns, which demonstrate how the estimated 
“average” effects actually mask a wide heterogeneity in the impact of the treatment.  
When considering Italian students and immigrants, it is clear that the impact of a grant 
is bigger for the latter than for the former. More specifically, financial aid increases 
the number of formative credits acquired in the first year of about 12.5 points for 
immigrants, while the (not statistically significant) difference for Italian students is 
2.6 points. Also the reduction of dropout rate at first year is much higher for 
immigrants (-25%) than for Italians (-5.2%): this pattern persists in the second year. 
Lastly, the impact on graduation within four years is similar for immigrants (+26%) 
and Italians (+27%). As regards the on-time graduation, even though the magnitude if 
the impact is about 15% for both types of students, only the impact on immigrants is 
statistically significant (at 5% confidence level). 
Within the group of Italian students, the impact of receiving a grant might be different 
across near-home students (those whose family lives in Lombardy) and students from 
other regions (who need to move to a different city to attend the courses). Such 
difference could arise because of the higher living costs that the latter group should 
sustain (e.g., for the accommodation). Recalling that we are comparing individuals 
with or without a grant within the group of relatively poor students (level 2 of the fee 
scale), it is likely that those who moved to another city are more helped by the 
financial aid than those who (can) live with their parents. Panel B shows that the grant 
has a lower impact on any dimension of academic performance for near-home 
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!students than for students from other regions. The impact on three output variables 
(formative credits acquired in the first year, dropout rate at first year and on-time 
graduation) out of five is negligible. This finding raises questions about the 
effectiveness of grants for near-home students. Conversely, the grant helps students 
from other regions in improving their academic results, albeit the magnitude of these 
effects is sometimes lower than that for immigrant students (see Panel A). The effect 
of grants on graduation (both on time and within four years) of students from other 
regions is strongly significant and high (+28.6% and +30%, respectively). More 
interestingly, such effect is even higher than that exerted on immigrant students. In 
the Panel B1, we report additional estimates about the impact of receiving € 1,000 as 
a grant. The estimates are based on the coefficients for far-from-home students, as the 
impact on students from Lombardy is not statistically significant. Assuming the 
current level of the grant (€ 4,700), the estimated effect of adding € 1,000 is an 
increase in the number of formative credits at first year of 1,6 (around 4.5% 
calculated at the sample mean), a reduction of the dropout of 2.6% and 4.1% in the 
first year and in the second year respectively, and an increase in the probability of 
graduation of about 6%. 
Finally, panel C reveals that receiving a grant is beneficial whatever the course 
attended (Engineering, Architecture and Design) even though the magnitude of the 
effect appears higher for Engineering students. This evidence suggests that for these 
students the receipt of a grant is more helpful and stimulates better performances. In 
particular, the high effect on the formative credits in the first year (+14/60 vs +7/60 
for students attending Architecture or Design) suggests that the channel through 
which the grant operates is stimulating better results in the first year – which, in turn, 
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!persists by reducing the probability to dropout in the first and second year more than 
for students attending Architecture or Design. Of particular relevance is the high 
effect in reducing first-year dropout (-22.7%). Furthermore, the effects persist and are 
higher than those for students attending Architecture or Design when considering 
dropout at second year and graduation – the estimated impact on graduation in this 
case is the highest one we obtained.  
Overall, the baseline results point at demonstrating that students who received a grant, 
on average, perform better than similar students who did not obtain it. However, such 
positive effect of grants is concentrated among particular subgroups of students: 
immigrants, Italian students from other regions, and students attending Engineering.     
  [Table 9] around here 
Partial treatment 
In this section, we checked whether the (positive) effect of receiving a grant is due to 
a cumulative treatment (i.e., obtaining the grant for two or three years consecutively) 
or if such effect stems from obtaining the aid in a single academic year. In this 
perspective, we define two kinds of “treatment”: (i) obtaining the grant in the first 
year and in the second year, and (ii) obtaining the grant for all the three years under 
scrutiny. We also define two control groups: (i) students who obtain the grant only in 
the second year, and (ii) students who obtain the grant only in the second year and in 
the third year. We do not include in the control groups the students who obtained the 
grant in the first year only, because losing the grant after the first year is a sign of low 
academic ability which prevents a meaningful comparison between treated and 
untreated students (i.e., students who did not confirm the grant from the first to the 
second year are likely to be systematically and endogenously different from those 
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!who did). At the same time, comparing “fully-treated” students with those who 
received the grant only for a part of their academic career helps in understanding 
whether there is a cumulative effect of the grant or not. 
The results are illustrated in Table 10, and point at demonstrating that students who 
got the grant for all three years achieve academic performances which are not 
statistically different from students who obtain the grant only in one or two years 
(with the exclusion of the first year). This result suggests that the grant operates more 
on the incentive side (i.e., the stimulus in performing to obtain it) than on the 
economic one (i.e., removing the liquidity constraints). Indeed, in the latter case 
obtaining the grant in a continuative way should be a prerequisite to see the academic 
effect at work.  
[Table 10] around here 
 
Narrower (more precise) control group 
The results presented in the previous sections might be affected by some selection on 
unobservable factors, such as the intrinsic academic motivation of the students. 
Indeed, we were able to match students with similar observable characteristics 
(family’s background, course attended, citizenship, gender, etc.), but we cannot rule 
the possibility that their “motivation” is systematically different between students 
who received a grant and those who did not. For instance, those students who did not 
apply for a grant (although having the characteristics to ask for it) could be less 
academically motivated than those who applied. To some extent, we take advantage 
of an information included in our dataset: we know which students applied for a grant 
but did not receive it, albeit being classified in the level 2 of the fee scale, so having 
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!the characteristics to become grants’ recipients. This is a small number of students 
who probably made errors in completing the administrative procedure, but who 
probably share the same “motivation” of the students who instead received the grant. 
In this section, we replicate our PSM estimations by considering only this small group 
of students as control group.14 This “restricted” control group includes 46 “untreated” 
students in the first year, 84 in the second year, and 115 in the third year. Because the 
group of “treated” students is bigger in all the three years (354, 224 and 166, 
respectively) we were forced to opt for a matching procedure with replacement, i.e. 
each observation in the control group can be matched with more than one observation 
in the treated sample. According to Dehejia & Wahba (2002), this procedure reduces 
the precision of the estimates: it should be kept in mind when reading the coefficients.  
Table 11 illustrates the results. As above, the second column reports the baseline 
results (“average” effect of the grant, ATT) shown in Table 5 for a straightforward 
comparison. The findings suggest that receiving a grant has a strong and very high 
effect in the first year: the grant helps increasing the number of formative credits of 
about 20 points (ATT is 10.3) and reducing the dropout after the first year of about -
35% (ATT is -17%). In other words, when considering the role of unobservable 
factors in defining the “true” control group, the effect is twice that estimated with the 
wider control group that was built only on the basis of observable factors. Moreover, 
the impact of the financial aid persists in second year (as it reduces the possibility of 
dropping out after the second year), and then disappears. A potential explanation is 
that those students who applied for the grant in the first year are those who really 
needed it, and the receipt of the grant is an essential condition to continue studying. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 As the control group is composed by a small number of students, we cannot explore further 
heterogeneity through this approach.  
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!Then, a large part of those students who did not obtain it dropout. This is why the 
estimated effect is so high in the first year.  
[Table 11] around here 
At the end of this subsection, we must also express some caution about these results. 
While this narrower control group is probably better suited to control for 
(unobserved) academic motivation of students, it may be affected by self-selection in 
terms of (unobserved) students’ capabilities. Indeed, we argue that these students 
made errors in compiling the administrative paperwork to apply for a grant. If such 
propensity to make errors is randomly distributed across students (this is our 
hypothesis), the results are robust. If it is not the case, the results are partially biased 
because of the difference in students’ abilities (between beneficiaries and students 
who did not receive the grant). We do not have adequate data to further explore this 
issue.  
 
8. Concluding remarks 
This paper assesses the effect of receiving a grant on academic performances of 
students attending a big, public Italian university. While the grant program has a 
strong need-based orientation, the merit requirements associated to it seem to 
stimulate higher performances among recipients. Indeed, the students who obtain the 
grant show better results than those who do not on several dimensions: they acquire 
more formative credits, have less probability to dropout, and graduate faster. Overall, 
the picture that emerges is of an effective grant program. Available data do not allow 
to understand the mechanisms behind the effectiveness of such financial aid, and 
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!especially if it helps more in removing liquidity constraints or stimulating 
performance. This is an obvious area of extension for future research.  
The evidence presented in this work casts serious doubts on the decision of the central 
government about the prospective public funds devoted to this program. In fact, the 
central government announced a reduction of State funding for the next years: while 
around € 150 million and € 100 million were available in 2011 and 2012, 
respectively, the money allocated to this policy is less than € 50 millions/year for 
2013 and 2014. If the regional governments will not fund the program with their own 
resources – which is quite implausible, given their declining budgets – the number of 
grants that will be available in the next years will be substantially lower than today.  
In the meanwhile, the central government is proposing a reform of the grant program 
that increases the number of formative credits to be acquired as a requirement to 
confirm the grant in the second year and in the third year. The results of this paper 
suggest that such initiative can be meaningful. As the merit-based component of the 
grant seems to (positively) stimulate students’ performances, a gradual increase in 
merit requirements can act as a further incentive towards gains in terms of absolute 
academic results. Arguably, empirical studies and practical experiences should inform 
policy makers about which level of merit requirement is desirable, to avoid setting 
unreachable targets.  
In a policymaking perspective, the most important finding concerns the heterogeneity 
of the grant effect. Indeed, when designing the program, it should be kept in mind that 
it affects very differently the various subpopulations of students. More specifically, 
the positive incidence of grants on academic performance is concentrated around 
immigrants and out-of-the-region students. Then, the issue will be understanding the 
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!lack of effectiveness for the other types of students, and eventually amending the 
program itself.   
A limitation of this paper is that the results cannot be straightforwardly generalized to 
all Italian universities. Politecnico di Milano is classified as the best/the second best 
university in Italy (see the national rankings15) and the students who enroll to it are 
likely to be more motivated and skilled than the average Italian student. Moreover, as 
fees are higher at Politecnico di Milano than at other universities, and living costs in 
Milan are high as well, an “income effect” might play a role (i.e., the liquidity 
constraints are less tight for students who chose Politecnico di Milano). All these 
caveats impose considering the results specific to the reality of Politecnico di Milano, 
and extendable only to similar institutions (e.g. Politecnico di Torino, etc.). 
Nonetheless, the findings must be interpreted as important for this university, as they 
demonstrate that receiving a grant makes the difference and can help disadvantaged 
students closing the gap. In the light of public policies aimed at reducing 
intergenerational persistence, it would be useful to extend the evaluation of grants’ 




15 In 2012, the ranking provided by the most influential Italian economic newspaper (IlSole24Ore) 
rated Politecnico di Milano as the best university in Italy. The ranking compiled by Censis-La 
Repubblica classifies it at the second place in the group “Politecnici”.  
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Figure 1. The number of eligible students and beneficiaries in the period 1997/98 – 
2010/11 
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Figure 2. The number of first-year students who obtained a grant in the academic year 
2007/08 and maintained it for the subsequent two years at Politecnico di Milano 
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!Figure 3. The number of formative credits (Cfu) acquired by students at the end of the 
first year (2007/08) – kernel density distribution 
 
 
Notes. Density is based on a kernel (Gaussian) estimate. The expected (regular) number of formative 
credits acquired each year is 60. Students included in these estimations are only those who are 
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!Figure 4. The number of formative credits (Cfu) acquired by students at the end of the 
third year (2009/10) – kernel density distribution 
  
 
Notes. Density is based on a kernel (Gaussian) estimate. The expected (regular) number of formative 
credits acquired each year is 60. Students included in these estimations are only those who are 
classified in the level 2 of the fee scale (reference year: 2007/08), and for whom the information about 
secondary school type is available. The treatment is defined as having received the grant for all three 
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!Table 1. Identification strategy: the number of students in each level of the fee scale 
 
Panel A. Year 2007/08: students who received the grant in their first year 
Fee scale  
(year 2007) 
Students 
WITHOUT a grant 
Students WITH a 
grant 
Total 
2 1,190 416 1,606 
3 390 19 409 
4 586 9 595 
5 734 3 737 
6 950 0 950 
7 699 0 699 
8 236 0 236 
9 115 0 115 
10 939 4 943 
Total 5,839 451 6,290 
 
Panel B. Year 2008/09: students who received the grant in the first AND second year 
Fee scale  
(year 2008) 
Students 
WITHOUT a grant 
Students WITH a 
grant 
Total 
2 648 213 861 
3 266 32 298 
4 435 10 445 
5 629 0 629 
6 923 0 923 
7 727 0 727 
8 239 0 239 
9 98 0 98 
10 975 17 992 




!Panel C. Year 2009/10: students who received the grant in the first AND second AND 
third year 
Fee scale  
(year 2009) 
Students 
WITHOUT a grant 
Students WITH a 
grant 
Total 
2 609 159 768 
3 237 23 260 
4 414 16 430 
5 580 0 580 
6 882 0 882 
7 724 0 724 
8 225 0 225 
9 115 0 115 
10 934 0 934 
Total 4,720 198 4,918 
 
Notes. These  numbers include all the students (i.e., also those for which there are some relevant 
missing information such as the secondary-school degree type), with the exception of those for which 
there is missing information about the level in the fee scale (n=579). The following tables report the 
information about the composition of the sample actually used for the empirical analysis.  
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!Table 2. Exclusion of students for whom information about secondary school type is 
missing 
 
Panel A. Number of lost observations 
Population  2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 
Students WITH grant (all) 416 213 159 
Students WITH grant (AND information 
about secondary school type) 
354 187 138 
Difference (%) -14.9% -12.2% -13.2% 
Students WITHOUT grant (all) 1190 648 609 
Students WITHOUT grant (AND 
information about secondary school type) 
869 477 463 
Difference (%) -27.0% -26.4% -24.0% 
 
Notes. “Treated” students are those labeled as “WITH grant”. The treatment is defined as having 
received the grant for all years: (two years consecutively in 2008/09, or three years consecutively in 
2009/10). The numbers are slightly different from those in table 2, as here we restrict the sample to 
students who are classified in the fee scale 2.  
 
 
Panel B. T-tests about the representativeness of the sample  
Students WITH a grant ("treated") 
Average for all 
the students in the 
level 2 (n=416) 
Average for the 
sampled students 
in the level 2 
(n=354) 
p-value 
Academic outputs       
Formative credits 2007/08 42.233 42.429 0.8935 
Dropout first year 8.6% 8.1% 0.8183 
Dropout second year 14.2% 14.1% 0.9815 
Graduation on-time 26.7% 26.6% 0.9678 
Graduation 54.6% 55.6% 0.7638 
Students' characteristics       
Male 59.9% 58.2% 0.6405 
Born in 1989|1990 64.9% 63.0% 0.5831 
Near_home_student 25.2% 20.3% 0.1053 
Other_region_student 40.4% 39.3% 0.7522 
Immigrant 34.4% 40.4% 0.0859* 
Course_Design 19.5% 19.5% 0.9943 
Course_Architecture 24.5% 24.6% 0.9854 
Course_Engineering 56.0% 55.9% 0.9828 
Secondary_schooltype_Lyceum 44.7% 52.5% 0.0303** 
Secondary_schooltype_Vocational 0.7% 0.8% 0.8438 
Secondary_schooltype_Technical 13.0% 15.3% 0.3685 
Secondary_schooltype_Foreign 26.7% 31.4% 0.1557 
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!    
Students WITHOUT a grant 
("untreated") 
Average for all 
the students in the 
level 2 (n=1190) 
Average for the 
sampled students 
in the level 2 
(n=869) 
p-value 
Academic outputs       
Formative credits 2007/08 35.316 34.320 0.3623 
Dropout first year 19.3% 21.1% 0.3354 
Dropout second year 13.8% 13.3% 0.7769 
Graduation on-time 19.7% 19.6% 0.9169 
Graduation 46.9% 45.0% 0.3939 
Students' characteristics       
Male 67.6% 65.1% 0.2337 
Born in 1989|1990 73.9% 73.7% 0.8779 
Near_home_student 64.0% 58.9% 0.0187** 
Other_region_student 22.8% 23.0% 0.8975 
Immigrant 13.2% 18.1% 0.0029*** 
Course_Design 16.1% 17.1% 0.5437 
Course_Architecture 29.2% 27.4% 0.3775 
Course_Engineering 54.7% 55.5% 0.7321 
Secondary_schooltype_Lyceum 42.0% 57.5% 0.0000*** 
Secondary_schooltype_Vocational 1.3% 1.8% 0.3799 
Secondary_schooltype_Technical 21.2% 29.0% 0.0001*** 
Secondary_schooltype_Foreign 8.5% 11.6% 0.0208** 
 
Notes. The sample used in the empirical analysis includes students in level 2 WITH information about 
school type.  ***, ** and * indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05 p < 0.10, respectively. P-value refers to the t-
statistic which tests whether the distributions of the variables related to all the students in the level 2 of 
the fee scale and to the sampled students in the level 2 of the fee scale are identical or not.   
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!Table 3. Year 2007/08: descriptive statistics  
 
Panel A. Students WITHOUT a grant (“untreated”; n=869) 
Variable Mean 
Male 65.1% 











Formative credits 20072008 34.3 
Dropout_year1 21.1% 
 
Panel B. Students WITH a grant (“treated”: n=354) 
Variable Mean 
Male 58.2% 
















!Table 4. The cohort of students enrolled in the academic year 2007/08 
  
N “Survival rate”  
(% of the initial cohort) 
  First year (2007/08)     
(a) Baseline cohort of students 1,223 initial cohort 
 
Students who obtained the grant in the 
first year 
354 initial cohort 
 
Students who did not obtain the grant in 
the first year 
869 initial cohort 
  Second year (2008/09)     
(b) Students (a) still enrolled 1,011 82.7% 
 
Students who obtained the grant both in 
the first and the second year 
224 63.3% 
 
Students who obtained the grant in the 




Students who obtained the grant in the 




Students who obtained the grant neither 
in the first year nor in the second year 
622 71.6% 
  Third year (2009/10)     
(c)  Students (a) still enrolled 845 69.1% 
 




Students who obtained the grant only in 




Students who obtained the grant only in 




Students who obtained the grant only in 




Students who obtained the grant only in 




Students who obtained the grant only in 




Students who obtained the grant only in 
the first year and in the third year 
17 
 
  Students who never obtained the grant  470 54.1% 
 
Notes. The initial cohort comprises all 2007/08 freshmen classified in the level 2 of the fee scale, for 
whom the information about secondary school type is available.   
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!Table 5. Baseline results: the impact of receiving a grant 
  OLS Logit PSM 

























    (7.20) (5.43) 
 
Notes. ***, ** and * indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05 p < 0.10, respectively. In columns 1 and 2, estimates 
are derived from OLS or logit regressions. In column 3, estimates are derived from a PSM procedure. 
Logit functional form was used to derive propensity scores. The sample of students was restricted to 
common support. T-statistics in round brackets. In column 2, we report marginal effects calculated 




!Table 6. Balancing properties: observable factors of treated and untreated students, 
before and after the matching 
 
Panel A. First year  
(students who received a grant in the academic year 2007/08 vs control group) 
Students' characteristics   Treated Control t-test 
Male unmatched 0.582 0.651 -2.28* 
 
matched 0.582 0.588 -0.15 
Born in 1989|1990 unmatched 0.630 0.736 -3.73* 
 
matched 0.630 0.655 -0.71 
Near_home_student unmatched 0.203 0.589 -13.07* 
 
matched 0.203 0.203 0.00 
Other_region_student unmatched 0.393 0.230 5.83* 
 
matched 0.393 0.393 0.00 
Immigrant unmatched 0.404 0.181 8.46* 
 
matched 0.404 0.404 0.00 
Course_Design unmatched 0.195 0.171 0.97 
 
matched 0.195 0.209 -0.47 
Course_Architecture unmatched 0.246 0.274 -1.01 
 
matched 0.246 0.271 -0.77 
Course_Engineering unmatched 0.559 0.555 0.15 
 




0.525 0.575 -1.60 
 




0.008 0.018 -1.27 
 




0.153 0.290 -5.08* 
 




0.314 0.116 8.5* 




!Panel B. Second year  
(students who received a grant in the academic years 2007/08 and 2008/09 vs control 
group) 
Students' characteristics   Treated Control t-test 
Male unmatched 0.563 0.619 -1.52 
 
matched 0.563 0.527 0.76 
Born in 1989|1990 unmatched 0.629 0.773 -4.35* 
 
matched 0.629 0.656 -0.59 
Near_home_student unmatched 0.192 0.585 -10.96* 
 
matched 0.192 0.192 0.00 
Other_region_student unmatched 0.415 0.253 4.78* 
 
matched 0.415 0.415 0.00 
Immigrant unmatched 0.393 0.163 7.62* 
 
matched 0.393 0.393 0.00 
Course_Design unmatched 0.219 0.177 1.43 
 
matched 0.219 0.254 -0.89 
Course_Architecture unmatched 0.223 0.311 -2.56* 
 
matched 0.223 0.228 -0.11 
Course_Engineering unmatched 0.558 0.512 1.21 
 




0.563 0.625 -1.70* 
 




0.004 0.011 -0.93 
 




0.138 0.255 -3.70* 
 




0.295 0.108 7.08* 




!Panel C. Third year  
 (students who received the grant in all academic years vs control group) 
Students' characteristics   Treated Control t-test 
Male unmatched 0.578 0.600 -0.51 
 
matched 0.578 0.506 1.32 
Born in 1989|1990 unmatched 0.639 0.800 -4.46* 
 
matched 0.639 0.705 -1.28 
Near_home_student unmatched 0.205 0.593 -9.40* 
 
matched 0.205 0.205 0.00 
Other_region_student unmatched 0.422 0.264 4.02* 
 
matched 0.422 0.440 -0.33 
Immigrant unmatched 0.373 0.143 6.97* 
 
matched 0.373 0.355 0.34 
Course_Design unmatched 0.223 0.178 1.34 
 
matched 0.223 0.271 -1.02 
Course_Architecture unmatched 0.187 0.303 -3.00* 
 
matched 0.187 0.193 -0.14 
Course_Engineering unmatched 0.590 0.519 1.64* 
 




0.572 0.658 -2.07* 
 




dropped dropped - 
 




0.127 0.254 -3.52* 
 




0.301 0.088 7.54* 
  matched 0.301 0.307 -0.12 
 
Notes. * indicates that the difference between treated and control group is statistically significant at 
least at 10% significance level. Values of the variables after matching are in italic. The last column 





!Table 7. Balancing properties: tests about the explanatory power of observable 
characteristics of students, before and after the matching 
  First-year students Second-year students Third-year students 
  unmatched matched unmatched matched unmatched matched 
Pseudo R2 0.122 0.006 0.127 0.003 0.133 0.012 
LR chi2 179.43 5.78 135.44 2.03 111.120 5.630 






!Table 8. Robustness checks on the impact of receiving a grant: 





probit in the 
first-stage 
Baseline results 
Formative credits 2007/08 15.489*** 10.213*** 10.331*** 
 
(2.77) (5.81) (5.88) 
Dropout first year -0.215** -0.169*** -0.169*** 
 
(-2.36) (-6.20) (-6.20) 
Dropout second year -0.147* -0.192*** -0.196*** 
 
(-1.71) (-5.98) (-6.09) 
Graduation on-time 0.127 0.205*** 0.193*** 
 
(1.23) (4.09) (3.82) 
Graduation 0.301** 0.277*** 0.259*** 
  (2.41) (5.79) (5.43) 
 
Notes. ***, ** and * indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05 p < 0.10, respectively. In column 1, estimates are 
derived from a PSM procedure, where we allowed replacements in the control group. Logit functional 
form was used to derive propensity scores. In column 2, estimates are derived from a PSM procedure, 
where a probit functional form was used to derive propensity scores. In both cases, the sample of 
students was restricted to common support. In column 3, baseline PSM estimates shown in Table 5. T-




!Table 9. Heterogeneity of the impact of receiving a grant 
 
Panel A. Italian students vs immigrants 
  Italian students  Immigrants  
Average effect 
(baseline results) 
Formative credits 2007/08 2.633 12.476*** 10.331*** 
 
(1.39) (4.30) (5.88) 
Dropout first year -0.052** -0.252*** -0.169*** 
 
(-2.12) (-5.01) (-6.20) 
Dropout second year -0.103*** -0.250*** -0.196*** 
 
(-3.68) (-4.05) (-6.09) 
Graduation on-time 0.147 0.146** 0.193*** 
 
(1.31) (2.03) (3.82) 
Graduation 0.270*** 0.258*** 0.259*** 












Formative credits 2007/08 3.535 7.658*** 10.331*** 
 
(1.16) (3.03) (5.88) 
Dropout first year -0.042 -0.122*** -0.169*** 
 
(-1.03) (-3.39) (-6.20) 
Dropout second year -0.070* -0.194*** -0.196*** 
 
(-1.77) (-4.46) (-6.09) 
Graduation on-time 0.147 0.286*** 0.193*** 
 
(1.31) (3.54) (3.82) 
Graduation 0.294*** 0.300*** 0.259*** 




!Panel B.1. The effect of receiving € 1,000 as a grant 
 
Outputs of "far-from-home" students Coefficient 
Effect of € 
1,000 
Formative credits 2007/08 7.658 1.6 
Dropout first year -0.122 -2.60% 
Dropout second year -0.194 -4.13% 
Graduation on-time 0.286 6.09% 
Graduation 0.300 6.38% 
 
 









Formative credits 2007/08 14.081*** 6.744*** 10.331*** 
 
(6.11) (2.79) (5.88) 
Dropout first year -0.227*** -0.109*** -0.169*** 
 
(-5.67) (-3.17) (-6.20) 
Dropout second year -0.208*** -0.121*** -0.196*** 
 
(-4.88) (-2.65) (-6.09) 
Graduation on-time 0.224*** 0.132 0.193*** 
 
(3.62) (1.58) (3.82) 
Graduation 0.316*** 0.176** 0.259*** 
  (5.01) (2.46) (5.43) 
 
Notes. ***, ** and * indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05 p < 0.10, respectively. In columns 1 and 2, estimates 
refer to subgroups of students (see Section 7). In column 3, baseline PSM estimates shown in Table 5. 
All the estimates are derived from a PSM procedure. Logit functional form was used to derive 




!Table 10. Partial treatment: the effect of receiving the grant for all three years vs 
receiving it only in one or two years 
 
  Partial treatment Baseline results 
Partial treatment (1): Control group - students who obtained the grant only in 
the second year 
Dropout second year 0.027 -0.196*** 
 (0.45) (-6.09) 
Partial treatment (2): Control group - students who obtained the grant only in 
the second and/or third year  
Graduation on-time -0.006 0.193*** 
 
(-0.04) (3.82) 
Graduation -0.048 0.259*** 
  (-0.41) (5.43) 
 
 
Notes. ***, ** and * indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05 p < 0.10, respectively. In column 2, baseline PSM 
estimates shown in Table 5. All the estimates are derived from a PSM procedure. Logit functional form 
was used to derive propensity scores. The sample of students was restricted to common support. 
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Formative credits 2007/08 20.251*** 10.331*** 
 
(3.50) (5.88) 
Dropout first year -0.350*** -0.169*** 
 
(-2.85) (-6.20) 
Dropout second year -0.138* -0.196*** 
 
(-1.79) (-6.09) 
Graduation on-time -0.157 0.193*** 
 
(-1.21) (3.82) 
Graduation 0.102 0.259*** 
  (0.85) (5.43) 
 
Notes. ***, ** and * indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05 p < 0.10, respectively. In column 1, estimates refer to a 
reduced control group, composed by students who applied for a grant but did not receive it. In column 
2, baseline PSM estimates shown in Table 5. All the estimates are derived from a PSM procedure. 
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